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Research Summary
Using open-source data from the Gun Violence Archive (GVA), we analyze national- and statelevel trends in fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults of U.S. police officers from 2014 to 2019 (N =
1,467). Results show (1) the majority of firearm assaults are non-fatal, (2) there is no compelling
evidence that the national rate of firearm assault on police has substantially increased over the
last six years, and (3) there is substantial state-level variation in rates of firearm assault on
police officers.
Policy Implications
GVA has decided strengths relative to existing data sources on police victimization and danger
in policing. We consider the promises and pitfalls of this and other open-source datasets in
policing research and recommend that recent state-level improvements in use-of-force data
collection be replicated and expanded to include data on violence against police.
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Introduction
After more than 50 years of social science research on policing in the United States, the danger
of police work remains a salient feature of police officers’ occupational environment (Loftus,
2010; Marenin, 2016; Sierra-Arévalo, 2019). Scholarly attention to the danger of policing has
been renewed by recent discussion of a “war on cops” that began after the 2014 police killing of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO. Proponents of this hypothesized war posit that the
contemporary political climate has resulted in widespread distrust and even disdain of police on
the part of public officials, academics, and the news media; in turn, the public has become
increasingly “anti-police” and emboldened to question, resist, and violently attack police officers
on U.S. streets (Mac Donald, 2016). However, despite widespread concern among police
administrators (Nix et al., 2018), empirical research on the most dire implication of a war on
cops—violence against police—finds no significant increases in fatal or non-fatal violence
against police in recent years (Maguire et al., 2017; Shjarback & Maguire, 2019). Nonetheless,
the issue of violence against police remains highly salient to U.S. politics and policy, including
the rise of the Blue Lives Matter movement and the growth in laws seeking enhanced penalties
for killing police officers (Craven, 2017).1
Despite the rich history of research on danger in police work, however, there are several
longstanding limitations to this body of scholarship. First, researchers’ operationalization of
“danger” tends toward the rarest, most extreme measure of danger in police work: felonious lineof-duty deaths that are driven by firearm assaults (see White et al., 2019, p. 14). This focus on
felonious deaths underestimates the total scope of the danger police confront by ignoring nonfatal violence against officers (c.f. Bierie, 2017; Bierie et al., 2016), including non-fatal firearm
assaults that, even though they do not result in a line-of-duty death, represent cases of deadly
force directed at police. Second, analyses that attend to all assaults on police officers better
capture less-than-lethal violence (e.g. punches, kicks) but do not differentiate such cases from
especially lethal threats like firearm assaults (Shjarback & Maguire, 2019; Tiesman et al., 2018;
c.f. Bierie et al., 2016). Third, data sources that rely on voluntary reporting by police (e.g.
LEOKA, NIBRS) are limited by a lack of consistent reporting by law enforcement agencies and
marked lag times in the release of said data, frustrating timely, confident estimates of a pressing
public safety and policy issue (Kuhns et al., 2016, p. 6; Nix et al., 2019, p. 6; Shjarback &
Maguire, 2019).
Because of its inattention to cases in which officers are shot but not killed, existing research
tends to provide either an underestimate of gun violence directed at officers or eschew specificity
in favor of an estimate of assault broadly defined. This, in combination with the data quality and
timeliness issues that affect datasets commonly used to examine violence against police, prevents
accurate estimates of total firearm assaults on officers that are of longstanding salience to the
issue of officer safety in the United States (Cell, 2019; The President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 239).2 Given the decided gravity of the
1
An analysis of emergency room data by Tiesman et al. (2018) departs from other studies of officer victimization
and finds a short term increase in non-fatal assaults. However, this trend was found only for 2007 to 2011; the trend
then decreased through 2014 to pre-2007 levels.
2
The threat of being shot on duty looms large in the United States where the supply of civilian-owned firearms was
recently estimated at approximately 265 million (Azrael et al., 2017). At least in part because of the large supply of
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problem at hand, there is a clear and urgent need for researchers to bring new, more timely data
to bear.
This article addresses these issues with open-source data provided by the Gun Violence Archive
(GVA), a non-profit organization that collects and constantly updates data on firearm assaults of
police officers across the United States. Because GVA records both fatal and non-fatal firearm
assaults on police, we are able to provide an estimate of firearm assaults on police officers that
includes (and differentiates) fatal and non-fatal shootings.3 We use these data to provide
national- and state-level estimates of fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults against police officers in
the United States from 2014 to 2019. We conclude with consideration of future directions for this
research as well as the promises and limitations of data like those collected by GVA in research
on violence against and by police. We also provide concrete policy recommendations for
improving the quality and timeliness of data on violence against police to better support police
agencies, researchers, and policy makers.
Literature Review
Social science research on the danger of police work in the U.S. can trace its roots back more
than half a century to foundational ethnographic studies of life on patrol. Early single-site studies
(Westley, 1953, 1970) and comparative studies (Banton, 1964) note officers’ tangible
preoccupation with danger and violence in the line of duty. Decades of subsequent scholarship
confirm the enduring importance placed by officers, supervisors, and the police organization on
the reality of violence in policing (Brown, 1988; Moskos, 2009; Sierra-Arévalo, 2016; Skolnick,
1966), especially when that violence proves deadly (Manning, 1977, pp. 7–8; Sierra-Arévalo,
2019).
Such qualitative research began to be complemented by quantitative analyses of line-of-duty
danger beginning in the 1970s. In 1971, a group of law enforcement executives—in response to
sharp increases in felonious officer deaths throughout the 1960s—called for an expansion of the
FBI’s data collection efforts on violence directed at police (Rabe-Hemp, 2017, pp. 61–62).
Beginning in 1972, the FBI began collecting more detailed information on both officers killed
and officers assaulted in the line of duty, eventually combining these data in 1982 into what is
now commonly known as LEOKA, or Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (FBI,
2019a). Researchers quickly took advantage of this new data source to quantitatively assess the
landscape of violence against police.
The earliest analyses of LEOKA data concentrate on felonious officer deaths, specifically in
cities, and uncovered a positive relationship with structural factors such as the percentage of the
city population that is Black, city crime rate, and the proportion of a city living in poverty
(Lester, 1977, 1984). Later city-level analyses examine the relationship between political, cityfirearms, officers in the United States are victimized by firearms at rates far greater than in European nations like
Germany or England (Zimring, 2017, pp. 79–80, 86).
3
We recognize that there are other forms of deadly (i.e. lethal) force that seriously injure or kill police in the line of
duty, such as assaults with a knife. Nonetheless, firearms stand are far and away the weapons used most often in
fatal attacks on officers. For example, the most recently recorded fatal stabbing in the Officer Down Memorial
Page’s data occurred in 2017. By comparison, there were 144 fatal firearm assaults between 2017 and 2019 (ODMP,
2020).
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level factors like Black representation in city council and Black mayorship on felonious police
deaths (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009; Kent, 2010). LEOKA has also
been used to examine felonious officer deaths at the national (Swedler et al., 2015), regional
(Fridell & Pate, 1995), and county level (Kaminski, 2008). Finally, other scholars have moved
beyond LEOKA and turned to the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) (Blair et
al., 2016), the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) (Bierie, 2017; Bierie et al.,
2016; Willits, 2014) or data collected by non-profit organizations like the National Law
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF) or the Officer Down Memorial Page
(Kaminski & Marvell, 2002; Maguire et al., 2017; White et al., 2019) to explore patterns in
felonious police deaths.
Scholars have noted for some time, however, that analyses focused on felonious line-of-duty
deaths systematically underestimate the full scope of danger that officers face by excluding nonfatal assaults (see Brandl, 1996). Accordingly, other research has analyzed non-fatal assaults,
specifically (Shjarback & Maguire, 2019; Tiesman et al., 2018), both fatal and non-fatal assaults
(Crifasi et al., 2016; Fridell et al., 2009), or some combination of fatal assaults, non-fatal
assaults, and line-of-duty accidents (Brandl, 1996; White et al., 2019). These related streams of
research provide invaluable insight but, of course, also come with important limitations.
With regard to studies that focus on non-fatal assaults or which examine both fatal and non-fatal
assaults, the clearest benefit of such research is its ability to describe the most common type of
violence directed at police. Estimates from the most recently available LEOKA statistics
illustrate this point: in comparison to the 55 officers feloniously killed in 2018 (51 by firearm),
nearly 59,000 were non-fatally assaulted (2,116 by firearm) (FBI, 2019b). This practical benefit
notwithstanding, special attention to non-fatal assaults often obfuscates the particular
phenomenon of assaults which, even if non-fatal, constitute a use of deadly force against police.
For example, Shjarback and Maguire’s (2019) time-series analysis of LEOKA data to investigate
trends in violence directed at police, though able to provide cautious estimates of national-level
trends in non-fatal assaults, does not analytically distinguish an injury caused by a fist or a bullet.
Tiesman et al.’s (2018) analysis of injurious assaults treated in U.S. emergency rooms and
analyses employing NIBRS data have the same limitation (Bierie, 2017; Willits, 2014).4
There are several studies that disaggregate fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults on police across
the U.S. Bierie and colleagues’ (2016) analysis of gun violence against police includes both fatal
and non-fatal firearm assault estimates drawn from NIBRS, improving on past research that
either focuses on fatal assaults alone or which conflates firearm assault with assault more
generally. However, though NIBRS collects data from multiple states and thousands of law
enforcement agencies, it is affected by data issues not unlike those that affect LEOKA (Kuhns et
al., 2016, p. 6). In 2010, the most recent year of NIBRS available to Bierie et al. (2016),
approximately 5,400 agencies from 37 states were represented in NIBRS, capturing only 37% of
agencies and oversampling on small- and medium-sized agencies (2016, p. 506). In the same
vein, though Crifasi et al. (2016) differentiate fatal from non-fatal firearm assaults in their study
4

Other studies, though able to differentiate firearm assaults from simple assaults, are unable to speak to nationallevel trends because their data are limited to a single city (Brandl, 1996; Brandl & Stroshine, 2003, 2012; Gibbs et
al., 2018).
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of assault lethality, their reliance on LEOKA data raises concerns about the reliability of their
firearm assault estimates similar to other studies employing this dataset.
Besides the lack of representativeness that characterizes LEOKA and NIBRS data, the issue of
significant lag times in the release of these data creates marked challenges in providing timely,
accurate analyses of deadly force against police. Though open-source data like those provided by
the National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund (NLEOMF) and the Officer Down
Memorial Page (ODMP) provide practically real-time data on officers accidentally and
feloniously killed in the line of duty, they do not record information on non-fatal assaults. As a
result, researchers interested in non-fatal assaults are largely restricted to data that are anywhere
from 18 to 24 months old (Kuhns et al., 2016, p. 6).5 This is, of course, neither the fault of
researchers nor, to our knowledge, the result of willful tardiness on the part of government—
collecting, cleaning, and collating data from thousands of independent law enforcement agencies
is a monumental undertaking. Nonetheless, the persistent limitations of existing data create clear
need for new, national-level data sources that can enable more timely investigation of firearm
violence against police and support the decision making of law enforcement agencies and policy
makers.

Data and Method
Data Source
This analysis uses data collected by the Gun Violence Archive (GVA), an independent, nonprofit organization whose mission is to “provide free online public access to accurate
information about gun-related violence in the United States” (GVA, 2020a). The GVA’s
definition of gun-related violence is expansive and tracks firearm homicides, suicides, and
injuries, as well as accidental shootings, defensive firearm uses, mass shootings, officer-involved
shootings, and more. To gather this data, GVA researchers monitor approximately 7,500 news
media, law enforcement, and governmental sources from across the United States for cases of
firearm violence. Additionally, GVA researchers manually sweep social media accounts (e.g.
Facebook, Twitter) and websites to gather relevant cases. For each incident, GVA records date,
geocoded location, city/county, state, available victim- and perpetrator-level information (e.g.
name, age, sex), incident type (e.g. “Shot – Wounded/Injured”, “Shot – Dead”), and URL links
to online sources that document each incident (GVA, 2020b).
Notably, while GVA collects data on officer-involved shootings of the public tracked by other
open-source efforts,6 GVA stands apart in that it also records firearm violence directed at law
enforcement officers. Additionally, GVA includes and differentiates fatal and non-fatal firearm
5

As Kuhn et al. (2016) discuss, though a LEOKA summary report on a given year is released nearly 12 months after
that year’s conclusion (e.g. the 2013 LEOKA summary report was released at the end of November 2014), the
detailed data necessary for more than summary statistics are released 16-18 months after year’s end. As a result, the
most recent LEOKA data available for Kuhn et al.’s report, written in 2015 and published in 2016, was for 2012.
6
Other open-source data sources that draw on media reports, submissions from the public, and public records
requests include: The Counted (Swaine et al., 2016), Mapping Police Violence (Sinyangwe et al., 2020), and Fatal
Encounters (Burghart, 2017).
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assaults, allowing for more complete and fine-grained estimation of the firearm violence that
results in the death and non-fatal injury of police officers.
Case Selection and Analytic Strategy
All cases in the GVA’s larger dataset in which law enforcement officers were shot (fatally and
non-fatally) were provided by GVA for the period between January 1, 2014 and December 31,
2019.7 We restrict our analytic sample in several ways.
First, we include active, sworn local and state law enforcement officers who are members of
agencies that respond to calls for service; this sample is composed largely of officers employed
by local departments at the city or county-level, sheriff’s departments, and state police agencies.
Additionally, our sample includes special jurisdiction officers such as transit or university police,
tribal police, and specialized state agencies like wildlife or park police whose patrol and
enforcement activities are reasonably similar to local and state departments. We exclude federal
law enforcement officers, parole and probation agents, and court officers who, though sworn, do
not engage in routine investigatory, patrol, or enforcement activity.
Second, our analytic sample is restricted to cases involving (a) on-duty officers, (b) whose
person or equipment (excluding vehicles) was shot,8 (c) with a firearm, (d) by someone who is
not a police officer (including while struggling with a suspect over a firearm).9 These criteria
exclude off-duty firearm injuries, injuries caused by means other than a pistol, rifle, or shotgun
(e.g. shrapnel from an explosion, pellet gun), self-inflicted firearm injuries whether accidental
(e.g. training accident) or intentional (e.g. suicides or suicide attempts), and “blue on blue”
shootings in which one officer accidentally shot another officer.10 Additionally, these criteria
exclude cases in which a suspect fired at but did not strike an officer, as well as those in which a
suspect pointed a firearm at an officer but did not fire.
To select this sample from the raw data provided by GVA, the authors (and a research assistant
directly supervised by the first author) independently checked each case (n=1962). The case-bycase check was accomplished by following the online sources recorded by GVA for every
7

The latter half of November 2019 and all of December 2019 were provided to the authors by GVA after the
beginning of 2020. An additional data pull from the GVA database was performed on January 10, 2020 to check for
additional cases from November and December 2019 that had not yet been found. No additional cases in those
months were identified by GVA in this final data pull.
8
We include cases in which officers were grazed by a bullet, shot in their ballistic vest or other protective equipment
(e.g. ballistic shield, ballistic helmet), and cases in which officers’ radios, duty belts, boots, secondary weapons, etc.,
were hit by bullets, bullet fragments, or shrapnel (e.g. glass, metal shards). We include such cases because they are
the outcome of suspects firing rounds at officers where the difference between minimal and significant injury is
exceedingly slim.
9
In cases of a struggle over a firearm, we included cases of officers being shot in a struggle over a firearm even if it
was unclear whether it was the suspect or the officer who pulled the trigger of the firearm. However, in cases where
the trigger-puller was unclear, we then considered whether other officers opened fire. If other officers opened fire
and it was not explicitly stated the an officer was hit by a round fired from the firearm over which a struggle
occurred, we excluded the case on the grounds that we could not rule out a “blue-on-blue” /“friendly fire” incident.
10
We focus on on-duty officers to more accurately estimate the prevalence of non-fatal firearm injury to officers in
the course of normal policing activities as opposed to cases in which off-duty officers happen to be victims (e.g.
victim of a robbery) or those in which they intervene in situations outside their official duties.
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individual listed in the dataset. Because URLs for online media reports were sometimes inactive,
Internet searches using the incident date, incident location, and available officer names were
used to find other sources to verify the incident. In the interest of providing a conservative
estimate of non-fatal firearm injury, cases for which media sources listed an officer as
“wounded,” “injured,” or “hurt” but did not specifically stipulate a gunshot injury from a bullet,
shot (e.g. shotgun ammunition), bullet fragments, or shrapnel were excluded. Similarly, cases in
which it was unclear if an officer shot themselves, was shot by a suspect, or was shot by another
officer were excluded to err towards a conservative estimate. Cases which coders were uncertain
how to code were flagged and reviewed by the authors to arrive at a final coding decision. Our
inclusion criteria and coding process produced an analytic sample of 1467 cases for our
descriptive analysis of fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults on police officers to provide estimates
at the national and state level (see Table 1).11
[TABLE 1 here]
To calculate national rates of firearm assault per 100,000 officers (or at the state level, per 1,000
officers), we use estimates of the number of sworn local and state officers from the FBI’s Police
Employee data (PE), which document the number of sworn officers at the agency level.12 As
mentioned in our discussion of past work, PE data (and the FBI’S UCR data more broadly) have
11

These 1,467 cases represent individual officers assaulted by gunfire during 1,185 incidents (1.24 officers per
incident). 510 cases were removed from our analytic sample based on manual verification and our inclusion criteria.
15 cases of an officer being shot that were not present in GVA data were found during independent verification of
cases (11 of which were retained). 6 cases were coded as “unverifiable” and excluded from our sample when no
online sources could be found to verify GVA-listed information. 8 cases were coded as “unclear” and excluded from
our sample because the available news sources did not provide sufficient information to definitively discern who
shot an officer. One such case described an officer who was non-fatally shot in the hand while making entry into a
residence to serve a search warrant. News sources indicate a suspect pointed a firearm at officers and was shot by
officers but do not stipulate the suspect ever fired their weapon. Another case involved an officer who was shot in
the foot while struggling with a suspect in a bar. A second officer present at the scene fired multiple rounds and the
suspect’s firearm was discharged once. News sources covering the incident did not state whether the officer was
struck by a round from the suspect’s weapon or that of the other officer. See Appendix A for a frequency table of
reasons for case exclusion. Note that these frequencies do not sum to 510 because cases could be excluded for
multiple reasons (e.g. a federal law enforcement officer who accidentally shot themselves, an off-duty deputy who
committed suicide).
12
Law enforcement officers are defined by the FBI as “individuals who ordinarily carry a firearm and a badge, have
full arrest powers, and are paid from governmental funds set aside specifically for sworn law enforcement
representatives” (FBI, 2019a). Our estimates exclude agencies that report they are “covered by” another law
enforcement agency in order to avoid double-counting officers. Our chosen denominator—population of local and
state officers—has strengths and limitations. To the former, this denominator is well-suited to estimate the average
risk of firearm assault faced by sworn state and local police officers. Because it does not require assumptions about
the type of interaction (if any) that precedes a firearm assault, we are able to include the greatest possible number of
firearm assaults in our analysis. Conversely, our denominator does not differentiate officers based on their
assignment (e.g., administrative versus patrol versus SWAT), obfuscating variation in officers’ exposure to the risk
of firearm assault and preventing estimation of assignment-specific risk profiles. Other denominators (all with their
own assumptions and limitations) could be used, including the rate of firearm assault vis-à-vis violent crime, firearm
crime, or arrest. An arrest-based denominator might, for instance, be preferred for estimation of the risk faced by
patrol officers since they are responsible for most arrests. On the other hand, appropriate use of an arrest-based
denominator would necessitate excluding firearm assaults that did not occur during an arrest—a problematic choice
since, between 2014 and 2018, only 5 percent of felonious officer deaths occurred during an arrest (FBI, 2019d).
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well-documented issues with incomplete reporting/missing data (King et al., 2011; Lynch &
Jarvis, 2008). We also note that 2019 PE data is currently unavailable at the time of this article’s
writing, further underscoring our critique of the lag time in the release of governmentallyproduced policing data. To address these two issues, we follow the suggestions of past research
(King et al., 2011, p. 450; Stucky, 2005) and use multiple years of PE data to impute missing
estimates of sworn state and local officers. Specifically, we calculate a quadratic regression
function for each state’s officer population for 2013-2018, then use the regression coefficients
for year and year2 to estimate missing state-years. We use this approach to impute a total of 53
values, 51 of which are 2019 imputations (50 states plus Washington D.C.) and two of which
correspond to a single year of missing data for Alaska in 2015 and West Virginia in 2014.13
Despite our use of multiple years of data to impute 2019 values for each state and mitigate the
unreliability of any single year estimate, there are some states in the PE data that show reporting
problems across several years. According to FBI UCR records (FBI, 2019c), three states—
Mississippi, Indiana, and West Virginia—had less than 75 percent of agencies in metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs), cities outside MSAs, or nonmetropolitan counties report data to the FBI
for every year between 2013 and 2018.14 We denote these three states in all our analyses of statelevel trends in firearm assault on police officers with “*” and discuss the broader implications of
such data quality issues in our Discussion.
Results
From 2014 to 2019, 249 police officers were fatally shot by suspects and 1,218 were struck or
non-fatally wounded by suspect gunfire (see Table 1). The total number of firearm assaults
during this period has shifted between a low of 189 in 2014 to a high of 288 in 2016. Over the
full 6-year period, an average of 245 officers a year were shot by suspects in the line of duty. Of
those shot, an average of 42 per year (17 percent) were killed; only 14 to 21 percent of firearm
assaults on officers each year result in fatalities, underscoring the importance of collecting and
analyzing data on non-fatal firearm assaults alongside those on fatal firearm assaults.
Figure 1 presents monthly frequencies of fatal and non-fatal firearm assault on officers from
2014 to 2019. On average, 20 officers were assaulted with firearms each month. The number of
monthly firearm assaults ranged from a low of 10 in February 2014 to a high of 46 in February
2016. Interestingly, there is no clear evidence of seasonality in firearm assaults on officers
overall or when looking at non-fatal firearm assault, running counter to seasonal patterns found
by some research for violence and crime more generally (McDowall et al., 2012; McDowall &
13

We selected a quadratic imputation function after benchmarking it against two other imputation models. The first,
a lagged value imputation, assumes no year-to-year variation in the state’s officer population and duplicates the
2019 value for the prior year of data (e.g. state-year population2019 = state-year population2018). The second, a linear
regression imputation, calculates a predicted state-year population value for every state-year by regressing state
officer population on year. The quadratic imputation is the same as the linear imputation save for the addition of a
year2 term that allows for variation in the slope of the regression function over time. For each of these imputation
methods, we then compared the predicted population estimates to the original values present in the PE data and
calculated the root mean squared error (RMSE) for each model to assess the magnitude of the error between
estimated values and the PB population estimates. Of our three tested imputation approaches, the quadratic
regression imputation model had the smallest RMSE values. See Appendix B for more information.
14
See Appendix C for an illustration of this data quality issue using 2018 UCR data.
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Curtis, 2015). Turning to longitudinal trends, though the trend in the monthly frequency of fatal
firearm assaults on officers is quite flat from 2014 to 2019, there does appear to be a slight,
upward trend in the monthly frequency of firearm assaults on officers, overall. This overall trend
is driven by the parallel trendline in monthly non-fatal firearm assaults. Without accurate
estimates of the population of officers in the United States per month, however, it is not possible
to calculate a monthly rate. Though, to our knowledge, no such monthly estimates exist, we can
aggregate monthly counts of firearm assaults into yearly counts and use yearly estimates of the
population of U.S. police officers to calculate annual rates.
[FIGURE 1 here]
Figure 2 does exactly this and plots the national rate of firearm assault on police officers (per
100,000 officers) from 2014 to 2019 and also disaggregates this overall rate into separate trend
lines for fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults. Across the time series, the national rate of firearm
assault on police was lowest in 2014 (29.92 per 100,000 officers) and highest in 2016 (44.11 per
100,000 officers). Overall, the national rate shows a slight upward trend between 2014 and 2019
(B = .750).
Turning to the disaggregated trend lines for fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults, two notable
patterns emerge. First, we find that year-to-year changes in the fatal and non-fatal firearm assault
rates do not consistently track one another over time. The rates of fatal and non-fatal firearm
assault diverge from 2014 to 2015, move in parallel between 2015 and 2017, and diverge again
from 2018 to 2019. Note also that 2017 to 2018 is the only period in which the rate of non-fatal
firearm assault on officers decreases while the rate of fatal assault increases. Overall, these
longitudinal patterns reinforce that trends in the national rate of firearm assault on police are
largely driven by changes in the rate of non-fatal firearm assault.
Similar to the frequency trends shown in Figure 1, the trend in the national fatal firearm assault
rate is quite flat from 2014 to 2019 (B = -.025) while the fitted linear trends for total firearm
assaults and non-fatal firearm assaults shows a slight increase (B = .750, .772). Of course, sober
interpretation of this increase is merited given that the slope of both of these trend lines is quite
small and represents a relatively small yearly increase in the number of officers non-fatally
assaulted with firearms. To illustrate this, let us assume a static number of officers drawn from
2018 UCR estimates of the number of full-time, sworn police officers in the United States:
686,665 (FBI, 2019c). Using this as a population baseline, we then look to the slope of the fitted
non-fatal firearm assault trend knowing that trends in total firearm assault are driven by changes
in non-fatal assault. The slope of the fitted trend for the rate of non-fatal firearm assault suggests
that, on average, an additional 5.3 officers were victims of non-fatal firearm assault every year
between 2014 and 2019.
[FIGURE 2 here]
Though certainly informative to study national trends, such analyses are likely to be affected by
aggregation bias wherein heterogeneity across smaller ecological units is masked (Kaminski,
2008; Kaminski & Marvell, 2002; Kent, 2010; Peterson & Bailey, 1988). That is, by combining
data from across the U.S. to produce national-level estimates, we risk losing sight of important
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variation at smaller units of analysis. To address this, we first provide a state-level view of the
frequency of firearm assaults on police for 2014 to 2019 (see Figure 3). Over this 6-year period,
states experienced an average of 28.77 firearm assaults, or 4.80 firearm assaults per year. Texas
(n=143) and California (n=112) had the highest number of firearm assault incidents over this
period, averaging 23.83 and 18.67 firearm assaults per year, respectively. In contrast, GVA data
indicate Delaware and Montana each experienced only two firearm assaults on officers over this
period.
[FIGURE 3 here]
Next, we calculate 6-year average firearm assault rates for each state to account for variation in
state-level officer populations (see Figure 4). Our results show substantial variation across the
United States. Officers in Mississippi, New Mexico, and Alaska experienced the greatest risk of
being assaulted with firearms over the last six years. Both Mississippi’s and New Mexico’s
average firearm assault rate from 2014 to 2019 were more than two standard deviations greater
than the national mean (.47 firearm assaults per 1,000 officers); Alaska’s rate was more than 1.5
standard deviations greater.15
[FIGURE 4 here]
At the other extreme, some geographically-clustered states showed markedly lower rates of
firearm assault on officers over this time period. For example, the 6-year average firearm assault
rate in New York and New Jersey was between .5 and 1 standard deviation below the national
mean, and Connecticut was the only state with a 6-year average rate more than 1 standard
deviation below the national mean. However, other geographic regions show more apparent
variation between states, such as in the southeastern U.S. where Florida—compared to Alabama,
Georgia, and South Carolina—appears to have been safer for police officers. In the southwest,
New Mexico stands out as considerably more dangerous than its neighboring states as measured
by its average firearm assault rate over the past six years.
Figure 5 displays the 6-year average firearm assault rate for each state and the District of
Columbia, and illustrates each state’s relative position to the U.S. mean over the same time
period. Here, we note that although 46 states and the District of Columbia fell within one
standard deviation of the mean, there is still meaningful variation among these states. Consider
Idaho, which had a six-year average firearm assault rate of 0.71 per 1,000 officers. Officers
working in Idaho were 1.9 times more likely to be assaulted with a firearm than officers in
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As we have noted, Mississippi’s rate was deemed unreliable and its rate should be interpreted with this in mind.
Appendix D shows new estimates for Mississippi and two other states using more reliable (but dated) estimates from
the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSSLEA) (Reaves, 2011). Even using a larger, more
reliable denominator for Mississippi only caused its ranking to fall from 1st to 3rd in terms of its average rate of
firearm assault on police. As such, we can be reasonably certain that Mississippi is one of the more dangerous states
in which officers work.
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neighboring Wyoming (0.38 per 1,000), and 2.5 times more likely to be assaulted with a firearm
than officers just south of them in Utah (0.28 per 1,000).
[FIGURE 5 here]
Even in the northeast, which we have noted is comparatively safer for officers than the rest of the
United States, we find notable variation across directly neighboring states, like New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania. Though geographically proximate, New Jersey’s average rate (.11) and
New York’s average rate (.10) are 3 and 3.3 times smaller than Pennsylvania’s (.33). There
appears to be even more variation when considering the states surrounding outliers like New
Mexico, a state with an especially high average firearm assault rate between 2014 and 2019.
New Mexico’s rate (1.56) is between 2.0 and 5.6 times higher than its directly neighboring
states: Oklahoma (.77), Colorado (.74), Arizona (.62), Texas (.54), and Utah (.28).
Discussion
In spite of the marked declines in line-of-duty deaths among police officers over the past 50
years (White et al., 2019), violence against police remains a problem that affects public
perception, police practice, and policy in the United States (Moule, 2019; Nix et al., 2018;
Sierra-Arévalo, 2016; Stoughton, 2016). And though scholars have done well to leverage
available data to empirically assess violence against police, longstanding definitional and data
quality issues continue to hamper the timely and precise estimation of the most lethal threat
officers face: firearm assault. With the help of open-source data on fatal and non-fatal firearm
assault on police officers gathered daily by the GVA, our analysis provides a fresh assessment of
this longstanding public safety and public policy concern.
With regard to national trends in firearm assault, our findings highlight the necessity of including
non-fatal firearm assault in discussions of danger in U.S. policing. As we have shown, the lion’s
share of firearm assaults on officers in the U.S. are non-fatal. Between 79 and 86 percent of a
given year’s firearm assaults on police do not result in a line of duty death. By extension,
conclusions stemming from analyses that employ data on fatal firearm assaults alone will be
derived from, on average, only 17 percent of total firearm assault cases. Indeed, given that the
difference between a fatal and non-fatal firearm can be a matter of luck—weapon caliber, wound
location, and total number of gunshot wounds all affect firearm assault lethality (Altheimer et al.,
2019; Braga & Cook, 2018)—it is vital to recognize that sole focus on fatal firearm assault will
inevitably and sorely underestimate the incidence of deadly force against police officers.
Additionally, our state-level analyses show marked variation across states and raise important
questions about what underlying structural conditions might explain these patterns. We believe
that GVA provides the means for researchers to revisit questions about violence against police
with a more nuanced operationalization of the firearm assaults that drive patterns in felonious
police deaths. For example, GVA data might be used to reexamine the relationship between
violence against police and demographic or structural factors that include racial and ethnic
composition, crime rates, poverty, or local political arrangements (Batton & Wilson, 2016;
Kaminski, 2008; Kaminski & Marvell, 2002; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009; Kent, 2010).
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Of particular interest is the relationship of state-level firearm ownership and firearm laws to
firearm assault on police. Though past work indicates that states with stronger firearm laws have
lower rates of firearm homicide, overall (Lee et al., 2017), and that lower rates of civilian firearm
ownership are associated with lower rates of police homicide, specifically (Swedler et al., 2015),
our results suggest heterogeneity in these factors is unlikely to fully explain state-level variation
in rates of firearm assault on police. For example, while Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and
Colorado are all “shall issue” concealed carry permit states with above average levels of firearm
ownership (CDC, 2019; Siegel et al., 2017), they vary markedly in their rates of firearm assault
on police. Further insight might be gleaned by investigating whether firearm laws and firearm
supply differentially affect rates of firearm assault on police depending on other features of
states’ legal and criminal justice systems. For example, easily accessible firearms might combine
with punitive sentencing laws to increase the likelihood of a suspect using deadly force to avoid
arrest and incarceration (e.g. Kovandzic et al., 2002).
GVA might also be used to sharpen and better integrate research on violence by police with that
on violence directed at police (see Fridel et al., 2019). For example, Legewie’s (2016) quasiexperimental analysis of NYPD Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) data finds that the murder of a
police officer by a Black suspect is related to increased use of force against Black New
Yorkers—no such effects were found for Whites or Hispanics. Using a regression-based
approach, Bejan et al. (2018) find that, across the U.S., an increase in felonious police deaths is
related to a same-day increase in police killings of minority individuals and a decrease in the
killing of White individuals; an increase in minority civilian deaths was related to a decrease in
police deaths, while an increase in White, non-Hispanic deaths was associated with an increase
in police deaths. Neither of these studies speaks to non-fatal firearm assaults on police. Future
work on the cyclical, potentially retaliatory nature of violence between police and public can be
improved by incorporating the non-fatal firearm assaults captured in GVA. These data would
allow better measurement of deadly force targeting both police and the public and, by providing
a greater number of data points across states, might reveal localized variation in police-public
violence that can explain the state-level variation in firearm assault we find in our descriptive
analyses.
Besides state-level differences in the prevalence of firearm assault on police, GVA data might
also be leveraged to investigate if and to what degree the lethality of firearm assaults varies
based on technology, training, and policy. Though research shows that ballistic body armor
significantly reduces the likelihood of an officer dying after being shot in the torso (Liu &
Taylor, 2017), there is significant variation in the strength of agencies’ body armor policies (e.g.
whether the agency has a “mandatory wear” policy) (Liu & Taylor, 2017). Though researchers
will have to contend with likely issues of small sample sizes driven by the relative rarity of
firearm assault on police, the combination of GVA data with LEMAS data on body armor
policies could be used to better understand how agency- and state-level variation in such policies
affect the likelihood of officers dying by way of firearm assault. Additional factors to consider
include whether agencies distribute tourniquets or other trauma care technology to officers, the
amount of training that officers receive on the use of this equipment, and the distance of firearm
assault incidents from a trauma care facility (Circo, 2019; Crandall et al., 2013).
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The insights and promise of these data notwithstanding, care should be taken to not extrapolate
too strongly from the slight, upward trend found in non-fatal firearm assaults recorded by GVA
from 2014 to 2019. In particular, it is prudent to consider that 2014 marked a shift in public and
political attention to policing following a string of highly-publicized police killings, including
that of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, 12-year old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, OH, and Eric
Garner in New York City, NY (Cobbina, 2019; Weitzer, 2015). It is possible that the lower rate
of firearm assaults on police in 2014 may be an artifact of measurement error born of either (a)
differential attention paid by news media to incidents of police victimization in 2014 relative to
later years, or (b) a change in the likelihood that police organizations notify news media of
incidents in which officers were shot. Bearing in mind that GVA only extends back to 2014, we
cannot rule out the possibility that GVA records more incidents of violence against police
precisely because of increased attention to policing and police violence. By the same token,
police departments and their administrators may be increasingly likely to notify the news media
of violence against their officers as a means to manage public perception or build public
sympathy in a tense political climate (Chermak & Weiss, 2005; Surette, 2001).16
Despite these potential measurement issues, GVA provides decided benefits for studying firearm
assault on police relative to data sources like LEOKA and NIBRS. Perhaps the clearest of these
is the speed with which GVA is released to the public. In contrast to the years-long lags between
the collection and dissemination of LEOKA and NIBRS data, GVA is updated on a daily basis.
Additionally, each case is uploaded with source URLs that allow for independent verification of
each case and which can be mined for other information such as the time of day a shooting took
place, the type of call to which officers were responding, what kind of weapon(s) were used,
whether bystanders were also wounded or killed, etc. Finally, GVA gathers data from across the
United States and uses sources from independent news organizations instead of police-generated
reports, sidestepping some of the reporting issues long known to affect LEOKA and NIBRS.
These notable benefits aside, we also emphasize that open-source data like GVA is not a cure-all
for the data quality issues of policing data writ large, and there are considerations when using
GVA that merit careful attention. Data sources on violence against police (or any police-related
data) cannot in and of themselves guarantee better estimates of social phenomena. This is
because no matter how good our estimates of the frequency of a given phenomenon, any estimate
of the rate of that phenomenon is dependent on the accuracy of the denominator—in the case of
firearm assault on police, this means the number of officers working in a particular geographic
area (see Tregle et al., 2019, pp. 2–3). Case in point, Mississippi’s firearm assault rate (2.29 per
1000 officers) must be considered alongside the fact that officer population estimates for
Mississippi are highly unreliable. In 2018, for example, scarcely more than 75 percent of the
agencies in Mississippi’s metropolitan statistical areas reported data to the FBI; the percentage of
agencies reporting drops to 37.9 percent when considering cities in non-metropolitan areas and
bottoms out at 20.7 percent in nonmetropolitan counties. Similar but less grave concerns exist for
Indiana and West Virginia (see Appendix C). All told, no measure of firearm assault on police
16

Potential measurement bias for 2014 should also be considered alongside the fact that estimated trends for a
limited time frame are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of individual years. If, for example, 2014 is dropped
and a new linear trend line is imposed on estimates for non-fatal firearm assaults from 2015 to 2019, the trend is
negative (B= -.573), indicating that, on average, 3.9 fewer officers per year were non-fatally assaulted with a firearm
during this period (see Appendix E.)
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officers, regardless of its precision and accuracy, can make up for unreliability in officer
population estimates when trying to calculate a state- or national-level rate.
Turning to GVA itself, two issues stand out. First, though the media-based reports collected by
GVA circumvent some of the reporting shortcomings of existing police-generated data, it
remains an open question as to the completeness of these reports and whether there is significant
variation across states in reporting of violence against police. Relatedly, just as it is unclear how
many cases present in other datasets are not present in GVA, it is unclear how many cases
recorded in GVA are not accounted for in existing datasets—a problem compounded by GVA’s
relative recency and the lag time associated with the release of LEOKA and NIBRS data. Future
research would do well to assess the differences between GVA and existing data with an eye
towards how much of these differences can be explained by operational definitions of violence
against police or reporting error.
Second, it is imperative for researchers to recognize the irregularity of these data and to carefully
and clearly operationalize the phenomena they hope to measure when cleaning and coding them.
Our own data cleaning and coding process resulted in 510 cases—nearly 26 percent of the total
dataset provided by GVA—being excluded from our analytic sample based on our inclusion
criteria. Additionally, the scope of GVA’s definition of gun violence also demands specificity in
researchers’ operational definitions. Our definition of fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults on
police officers allows for precise exclusion of a variety of other instances in which officers were
shot, including on-duty firearm suicides, cases of officers accidentally shooting themselves, and
“blue on blue” cases in which an officer was accidentally shot by another officer. Importantly,
our operational definition of firearm assault was informed by existing research on the dangers
that officers emphasize on patrol and which drive felonious line of duty deaths, as well as the
authors’ domain-specific expertise on the untidy, often unclear circumstances in which police
work takes place.
Even with our efforts to craft a precise set of inclusion criteria, some cases forced imperfect
choices. For example, Sergeant Ron Helus of the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department was shot
six times while responding to an active shooter situation. Though five of those shots were fired
by the suspect, a coroner’s report found that the sixth gunshot wound was caused by a rifle round
fired by another officer. This round struck Helus in the heart and was ruled to be the cause of the
deputy’s death (Berman, 2018). We elected to retain this case as an example of a non-fatal
shooting by a suspect because, even though we could confirm the deputy was shot by a suspect,
we could not conclusively determine if the deputy would have died had another officer not shot
him through the heart. Other researchers coding the same case might very well have made a
different coding decision. We present this example not to argue that our definitional choices are
perfect but to lay bare and emphasize the ambiguities intrinsic to reducing complex social
realities into even seemingly clear-cut variables like fatal/non-fatal or suspect-/officer-inflicted.
Such considerations are especially important in light of the growing use of media- or crowdsourced data in research on police. At the end of 2019, two high-profile articles—one employing
data from Fatal Encounters, the other from Mapping Police Violence—came under scrutiny for
coding errors and debatable coding decisions. Besides clear errors wherein a suspect shot by
police who was coded as “unarmed” was verifiably armed, cases in which a suspect was in
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possession of a toy/replica firearm or in which a suspect crashed and died while fleeing from
officers were coded the same as cases in which officers shot a suspect armed with a real firearm.
Once coding errors were amended or cases like those involving toy guns or non-traditional
weapons (e.g. screwdriver) were coded as “armed,” the reported effect of exposure to police
shooting unarmed Black suspects on the birthweight of Black infants or on the mental health of
Black Americans was reduced to statistical non-significance (AAAS, 2019; Lozada & Nix, 2019;
Nix & Lozada, 2019). We chose to manually check each case in the GVA dataset to avoid such
issues and, in our opinion, such steps are necessary when using any media- or crowd-sourced
data. Thankfully, the richness of the GVA data and the inclusion of online sources with each case
allows for researchers to verify cases independently and, perhaps more importantly, to finely
tune and apply their inclusion criteria to enhance the precision of their measurements.
Even with careful verification of cases, of course, any analysis built on GVA will be limited to
estimates of gun violence. We maintain that studying gun violence against police is critically
important given its lethality and its centrality to police training, culture, and operations (Carlson,
2019; Sierra-Arévalo, 2016, 2019). However, it bears repeating that studies of gun assaults
cannot speak to the far more common cases of simple assault on police (FBI, 2019b). Even
studies that capture the larger universe of assaults on police do not accurately measure the more
general “resistance” to police examined in prior research (Terrill, 2003). We suggest that these
phenomena can both be considered examples of what might be more broadly conceptualized as
police-public conflict. Though there are significant challenges to integrating data on violent
assault with that on disrespect or non-violent resistance (especially for multiple agencies), it
would behoove researchers to consider how to integrate measures of police-public conflict that
can range from lethal violence to low-level disrespect. Such integration would provide valuable
insight into not only how lower-level police-public conflict predicts serious violence against
police but also how the range of police-public conflict shapes officers’ perceptions of the public
and their use of coercive force (Nix et al., 2018, 2020).
With these benefits, limitations, and cautions regarding GVA in mind, we conclude with some
concrete suggestions as to how current data collection policies and practices might be amended
to improve data used to assess the danger of police work. The longstanding calls for better data
on force used by police and the decades of largely insufficient attempts to remedy the lack of a
national database on police use-of-force are instructive in this regard. First, efforts to understand
and address issues of violence by and against police are characterized by a common problem:
data that prevents accurate measurement of the phenomenon at hand (Shane, 2018, pp. 128–129).
As we have already described, and as discussed at length by others (Hickman & Poore, 2016;
Klinger et al., 2016; Nix et al., 2017), existing data are insufficient for making precise, reliable
estimates of police use-of-force in the United States. Data on violence against police are drawn
from the same or similarly flawed data sources (e.g. UCR, NIBRS), and officer employment data
required to quantify the scope of violence by and against police are often drawn from these same
sources. Even officer population statistics drawn from the Census of State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) or Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics (LEMAS) data are of limited utility for timely analyses given that the most recent
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CSLLEA is over a decade old and LEMAS, which is administered every 3 years, takes between
2 and 3 years to be released once data are collected (Reaves, 2011; Banks et al., 2016). 17
We believe that the parallel problems that plague data on police use-of-force and violence
against police can be addressed through common mechanisms, leveraging (and expanding)
efforts to improve shortcomings in the former to also improve the latter. Recognizing that the
federal government has historically struggled to compile timely and reliable national-level
criminal justice data (Alpert, 2016; Alpert, 1948; Zimring, 2017), we see more promise in efforts
to compile such data at the state level. These state-level data could then be aggregated to
generate regional and national estimates. To date, six states—California, Colorado, Connecticut,
North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas—have begun collecting and publishing data on police use-offorce (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018; Shjarback, 2019).
Such efforts, though discussed primarily as a means to gather data on violence by police, could
and should be used to gather higher quality data on violence directed at police. California stands
apart as a state that is already moving their data collection efforts in this direction. Currently, the
California Attorney General compiles state data on use of force incidents resulting in serious
injury or death, including fatal and non-fatal firearm assault as well as non-injurious firearm
discharges for its annual URSUS report. Importantly, these data capture firearm violence that
includes incidents wherein officers shoot or shoot at civilians and incidents in which an officer is
shot or shot at by a civilian. Thus, California’s data on deadly force captures not only fatal
shootings but also non-fatal shootings and non-injurious shootings, both of which far outpace
fatalities and which are necessary to provide holistic understanding of the danger associated with
policing in the state (Fyfe, 1988; Nix et al., 2017).
In 2018, URSUS recorded 630 incidents, detailing not only demographic information on officers
and members of the public involved, but also the circumstances that preceded each incident, the
number of officers and agencies present, level of civilian resistance, indicators of civilian mental
status, and more. That the most populous state in the U.S. can compile such rich data on
hundreds of cases every year suggests that similar efforts can and should be replicated by all
states. And though the rollout of new data systems will always come with implementation
challenges, the advent of open-source, cloud-based options of the kind that undergird the
URSUS system can drastically reduce development costs and sidestep the need for individual
agencies to build out their own data collection infrastructure (Williams, 2016). The more states
that take the necessary steps to improve their policing data, the better positioned police
departments, researchers, policy makers, and the public will be to measure, understand, and
address the deeply intertwined issues of violence by and against police.

17
Garner et al. (2018) is one exception that uses LEMAS and UCR data to provide a national estimate of police
force for 2012. However, because their analytic sample is composed of only 1,646 agencies, their national estimate
requires significant imputation that cannot provide reliable agency- or state-level estimates of force. What’s more,
such techniques do not address the fact that timely estimates of police use-of-force with these data are impossible
given that LEMAS is released every three years.
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Figure 5. 6-Year Average Rate of Firearm Assault on Police by State, 2014-2019

Appendix A: Frequency Table of Reasons for Case Exclusion
Reason for Case Exclusion
Not Active Duty State or Local Law Enforcement
Federal Employees
Not a Law Enforcement Officer
Retired or Off-Duty
Self-Inflicted
Suicide
Blue on Blue
Officer Lied or Committed Crime
Duplicate Case
Unverifiable Case
Unclear Circumstances

Cases
129
60
24
102
188
45
101
7
18
6
8

Note: Case total does not sum to number of excluded cases (n= 510) because cases could be excluded for multiple
reasons. For example, 22 of the 60 federal employees would have been excluded for at least one of the other
reasons listed above.
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Appendix B: Police Employee Data, 2013 – 2018 and Two Imputed Estimates for 2019.
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

2013
9492
1312
11955
5893
76912
11981
8517
2339
4579
42346
21498
2886
2707
9420
7054
5035
6174
7092
8228
2243
17312
16293
16909
8743
2903
14400
1684
3497
5359
2612
24460
353
58528
23258
1471
13147
7841

2014
7698
1258
12663
5917
77190
10478
8634
2194
4535
36054
19881
3006
2725
24358
8763
5003
6804
7101
10037
2285
15893
16644
17028
8879
2524
14458
1435
3644
5501
2583
29668
3341
58370
23980
1593
9616
6897

2015
8801
1227.4*
12807
5860
77402
11835
7918
2239
4264
36287
19690
2939
2766
13295
8169
5183
5864
6321
9118
2280
17379
17033
16996
9211
2415
14347
1853
3722
6299
2632
30272
977
60821
23775
1698
13256
7517

2016
6978
1219
12474
5943
77849
11972
7944
2283
4174
34436
20223
2995
2770
23897
5539
5241
6559
3709
15274
2311
17158
16686
17142
9413
2506
14572
1612
3523
6341
2699
30811
3176
62484
24006
1761
12765
8561

2017
5235
1247
12862
5976
78740
11402
7849
2325
4228
44593
24044
2951
2851
25215
7794
5252
6874
7659
15418
2322
15535
16511
17081
9689
2884
14688
1917
3345
6789
2764
31341
2933
62433
24070
1749
13460
8828

2018a
10661
1286
12756
6743
79141
12512
7792
2315
4393
42880
27250
2844
2894
26744
9349
4716
6575
7386
13960
2349
15410
16717
17229
9927
2700
14428
1839
3797
6273
2838
31817
2710
62327
24004
1776
14976
8893

2019b
11926.8
1357.7
12497.4
7185.5
80051.7
13145.9
7782.6
2424.7
4558.9
52508.1
32969.7
2731.1
2964.7
27547.3
10142.8
4460.0
6828.5
9516.2
15087.9
2363.7
14373.0
16287.9
17259.5
10213.2
3158.1
14474.0
1988.5
3711.9
6159.6
2958.5
29969.8
2262.5
62487.2
23794.6
1723.1
17131.1
9904.7

2019c
7807.5
1243.8
13013.1
6506.3
79496.5
12253.1
7513.6
2314.2
4168.1
42076.3
26275.9
2904.9
2917.2
30467.5
8371.8
4992.7
6766.0
6597.9
17101.7
2365.5
15367.3
16784.7
17254.7
10165.5
2670.9
14587.7
1921.3
3628.4
6941.3
2862.0
33962.5
3524.3
64111.9
24271.9
1880.3
14888.6
9299.2
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State
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
a

2013
5959
25278
2434
11521
1529
16595
46059
3236
1158
18756
10341
3534
12504
1605

2014
6356
24611
2497
9552
1669
16774
38512
4879
1194
18858
10311
3671.6*
12776
1322

2015
6538
25525
2441
11470
1501
16613
45451
4865
1149
18769
10341
3806
12772
1294

2016
6237
25191
2469
11792
1659
16766
46521
4902
1155
18953
10507
3679
12846
1253

2017
6767
25839
2504
8380
1780
16736
43699
4988
1196
19036
10718
3669
12870
1243

2018a
6553
25505
2494
11553
1771
17363
44857
5106
1392
19258
10820
3592
12704
1490

2019b
6514.7
25873.5
2507.9
11139.6
1890.1
17656.4
45992.1
4429.9
1516.2
19475.8
11115.2
3399.0
12534.6
1736.2

2019c
6791.9
25773.3
2508.1
10407.9
1821.6
17195.7
45245.3
5634.1
1325.5
19261.1
10884.5
3677.8
12880.9
1282.5

Note: we also tested the fit of a model that assumed no year-over year change between 2018 and 2019 (RMSE = 2015.18). Though not displayed here, its imputed values for
2019 equal those listed in the “2018” column for each state.
b
Imputed values calculated using the coefficients for year and year2 from a quadratic regression model used to estimate officer population at the state level (RMSE = 948.78).
The values in this column are the values selected as our final imputation values for 2019.
c
Imputed values calculated using the coefficient for year from a linear regression model used to estimate officer population at the state level (RMSE = 1105.73).
* Entries for WV (2014) and AK (2015) reflect imputed estimates derived from a quadratic regression equation regressing officer population on year and year2.
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Appendix C: Percentage of Agencies in Each State that Submitted UCR Data in 2018
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Metropolitan
statistical areas
94.3
100.0
99.3
99.7
99.9
95.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.9
96.6
100.0
100.0
92.1
84.4
90.7
83.8
99.7
97.2
100.0
100.0
97.5
98.8
98.6
75.9
99.8
100.0
99.8
100.0
99.2
100.0
92.5
99.7
89.1
100.0
90.1
99.9
99.3
99.7
100.0
98.8
99.1
99.9
98.2
99.4
100.0
99.9
98.6
81.9
98.2
81.3

Cities outside
metropolitan areas
93.1
97.1
96.3
91.1
100.0
94.9
100.0
n/a
n/a
95.0
88.7
n/a
95.7
83.2
59.0
100.0
95.4
97.5
80.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
98.0
99.7
37.9
98.5
100.0
92.9
100.0
93.6
n/a
96.0
97.4
86.2
99.8
80.9
99.3
95.0
98.9
n/a
97.0
96.0
100.0
93.4
89.6
100.0
97.8
92.8
54.3
99.5
91.9

Nonmetropolitan
counties
91.9
100.0
100.0
84.9
100.0
91.5
100.0
n/a
n/a
100.0
93.5
100.0
98.3
89.7
51.4
97.0
96.6
100.0
96.7
100.0
100.0
98.8
99.2
100.0
20.7
100.0
99.3
84.6
100.0
93.4
n/a
97.4
100.0
95.3
100.0
86.0
97.9
84.3
100.0
n/a
96.3
82.8
100.0
98.4
90.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
86.7
100.0
89.1
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Appendix D: 6-Year Average Rate of Firearm Assault on Police by State, 2014-2019.
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Appendix E. National Rate of Firearm Assault on Police, 2015-2019

